Skip to content

Zero Trust

Last reviewed: August 2026

Traditional network security follows a Perimeter Security model: trust everything inside the firewall, block everything outside. But with cloud, remote work, and SaaS adoption, the boundary between “inside” and “outside” has disappeared.

Zero Trust follows the principle “Never trust, always verify.” Every access request is verified regardless of network location.

graph LR
    subgraph "Perimeter Security Model"
        A[Outside firewall = untrusted] -->|VPN| B[Inside firewall = trusted]
    end
graph LR
    subgraph "Zero Trust Model"
        C[Every access request] -->|Verify identity + device + context| D[Grant least privilege per resource]
    end
Principle Description Implementation examples
Identity-based access Control access by user/workload identity, not network location IAM roles, Workload Identity
Least privilege Grant access only to the resources needed, only for as long as needed JIT access, time-limited tokens
Explicit verification Verify every request every time (no cached trust) MFA, device posture checks, location-based policies
Assume breach Design as if a breach has already occurred Microsegmentation, encryption, logging
Continuous verification Continuously reassess trust level even during a session Conditional Access, anomaly detection
Area AWS Azure Google Cloud OCI
Network access (ZTNA) Verified Access — supports HTTP(S) plus TCP/SSH/RDP/DB (TCP protocol support reached GA in December 2024), can replace VPN Entra Private Access BeyondCorp Enterprise Zero Trust Packet Routing
Identity-based access IAM + Identity Center Entra ID + Conditional Access IAM + Workload Identity Federation Identity Domains + dynamic groups
Microsegmentation Security Groups + PrivateLink NSG + Private Endpoints VPC Service Controls + Firewall Rules NSG + Network Path Analyzer
Device trust Verified Access device policies Intune + Conditional Access BeyondCorp device certificates — (third-party integration)
Workload-to-workload authentication IAM Role + STS Managed Identity Workload Identity Federation Instance Principal

Zero Trust does not replace VPC/subnet-based network security — it complements it.

Layer Role Tools
Network layer (existing) Bandwidth control, DDoS defense, basic isolation VPC, subnets, Security Group, WAF
Identity layer (Zero Trust) Who accesses what, under what conditions IAM, Conditional Access, ZTNA
Stage Activities Goal
1. Identity consolidation Consolidate all users/services into a central identity system Know who is accessing what
2. MFA + conditional access Enforce MFA on all access, add location/device conditions Build a baseline verification framework
3. Apply least privilege Remove excessive permissions, introduce JIT access Minimize blast radius in a breach
4. Microsegmentation Allow only explicitly permitted communication between workloads Block lateral movement
5. Continuous monitoring Collect all access logs, detect anomalous behavior Detect breaches early
  • Apply MFA to all user accounts (no exceptions)
  • Build an inventory of service accounts/workload identities
  • Integrate SSO with an external IdP (Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, etc.)
  • Verify device posture through MDM (mobile device management) integration
  • Apply conditional access policies based on location/time/device posture
  • Remove policies that grant trust based on VPN connection alone
  • Use IAM permission audit tools (IAM Access Analyzer, Entra ID Access Reviews)
  • Detect and remove unused permissions (90-day unused threshold)
  • Minimize standing privileges through JIT (Just-In-Time) access
  • Separate VPC subnets by workload type
  • Whitelist inter-service communication (deny by default, allow explicitly)
  • Implement via a service mesh (Istio, Linkerd) or network policies
  • Enable anomaly detection tools (GuardDuty, Defender, SCC)
  • Integrate with a SIEM for centralized log analysis
  • Establish access pattern baselines and alert on deviations
  • Applied MFA to all user accounts (prioritize phishing-resistant MFA)
  • Built an inventory of service accounts/workload identities
  • Applied short-lived credentials to non-human identities (service accounts, AI agents, CI/CD bots)
  • Removed trust based on network location (no trust granted from VPN connection alone)
  • Applied conditional access policies (device posture, location, time-based)
  • Applied workload identity (SPIFFE/OIDC/Instance Principal) to inter-workload communication
  • Achieved visibility into east-west traffic (internal communication)
  • Centralized access logs and configured anomaly detection (including ITDR)
  • “We have a VPN, so we’re Zero Trust” — VPN only creates a network boundary and is a different concept from Zero Trust. Every request must still be verified even inside the VPN.
  • “The internal network is safe” — a traditional approach that ignores insider threats and account takeover scenarios.
  • “Roll it out organization-wide all at once” — attempting a full rollout without a staged approach carries a high risk of operational disruption. Apply it progressively, starting with critical systems.

2025-2026 Trend: Identity-first Zero Trust

Section titled “2025-2026 Trend: Identity-first Zero Trust”

The center of gravity in Zero Trust is shifting from network-based controls to identity-based controls (NIST SP 800-207, CISA ZTMM).

Managing non-human identities — AI agents, service accounts, CI/CD pipeline bots — has become a new challenge.

Challenge Response
Long-lived credentials left unmanaged Shift to short-lived tokens (STS), OIDC federation, and instance-metadata-based authentication
Over-privileged service accounts Detect unused permissions (IAM Access Analyzer, Entra Access Reviews), JIT access
Verifying AI agent identity Workload identity + conditional access + least-privilege per tool
Detecting anomalous non-human identity behavior ITDR (Identity Threat Detection & Response)

Microsoft introduced Entra Agent ID, which treats AI agents as independently managed first-class identities in the directory (announced at Build 2025). Agents receive the same conditional access, lifecycle management, and audit logging as human identities. For details on agent adoption governance, see the AI Agent Adoption Guide.

Vendor Change
Microsoft Applied Conditional Access + Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) to Entra Workload ID
AWS Made MFA mandatory for member account root users, increased IAM role/OIDC provider quotas
Google Cloud Expanded Workforce Identity Federation — attribute-based SSO without synchronization, context-aware IAM

In multicloud/hybrid environments, SPIFFE/SPIRE (a CNCF Graduated project) can standardize mutual authentication between workloads. It automatically issues and rotates short-lived credentials (X.509 SVID, JWT), eliminating long-lived secrets.

Cloud security capabilities that were operated as separate, siloed tools are consolidating into CNAPP (Cloud-Native Application Protection Platform) — the foundation for automating Zero Trust’s “always verify” principle.

Component Role Relation to Zero Trust
CSPM Detects cloud misconfigurations Proactively blocks improperly opened access paths
CIEM Manages cloud identity/permissions Detects excessive permissions, including for non-human identities. Azure: Entra Permissions Management stopped selling as a standalone SKU from April 2025 and folded its core CIEM capabilities into Defender for Cloud CSPM. Existing customers can continue under their existing license terms
CWPP Protects workload runtime Runtime defense under an assume-breach posture

The current direction is to manage these three components together around identity, since misconfiguration and privilege sprawl are cited as the leading paths to cloud breaches.

Zero Trust is a security model (a philosophy), and IAM is the implementation mechanism. IAM is the key tool that realizes Zero Trust’s principle of “always verify.” For practical IAM design, see IAM in Depth.